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JEAN KELLER
25 Years of Care Ethics  
A Personal Retrospective
An earlier version of his essay was presented as part of a panel discussion in June 
2008 at the National Women’s Studies Association Conference in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice. 
Flashback: Home Economics Class, 8th Grade, Circa 1977
Sitting in my newly co-ed home ec class, with two boys who decided a 1:8 gender 
ratio just might be the right move for their love lives, I toil over my first and last knit-
ting project — a rather misshapen kitty cat. In the course of conversation, I announce 
loudly to my fellow knitters my liberal feminist intentions: “I am not going to get 
married and I am not going to have children; when the time comes, I’m just going to 
live with some man and follow my career.” 
Keeping this early declaration in mind, it shouldn’t be surprising that, eight years 
later when I am first introduced to Carol Gilligan and the ethic of care, my response 
is suspicious. By claiming that women utilize an ethic of care while men use justice, 
Gilligan seems to suggest that women are better suited for caregiving roles within 
the home than for professional life. Thus, I see her as calling into question my liberal 
feminist aspiration — to craft a self-chosen life that foregrounds self-development and 
career. 
Some 30 years later, I have a career — and a husband and two children. I teach 
ethics and feminist philosophy at a small Catholic women’s college in central Min-
nesota. Needless to say, my views on work, family, feminism, and care ethics have 
changed dramatically since 8th grade. I have evolved from an early skeptic of care 
ethics to someone who thinks its critical examination of the many ways women’s care 
giving work has been marginalized and devalued is radical, transformative, and vitally 
important feminist philosophical work. In this autobiography, I map out some key 
moments in my personal engagement with care ethics. As you’ll see, care ethics and I 
literally grew up together. By using my personal story to recount the development of 
care ethics over the past 25 years, I hope to put the theory into historical context and 
provide partial insight into what care ethics meant to the first generation of women 
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who encountered it. Given care ethics’ contention, that moral reflection is narrative 
in nature, story telling seems an especially fitting way to portray the evolution and 
significance of this theory.
Phase I: 1970s–1980s — Liberal Feminist
My mom’s major life decision, the family story goes: should she fulfill her lifelong 
dream to become a Catholic nun or marry my father, whom she had been dating 
steadily since the 8th grade? She chose marriage, and six children followed in quick 
succession. My parents were on a journey that would take them from their German 
Catholic working-class roots and extended family in Ohio, to a nuclear family in 
Pennsylvania that achieved upper middle class status through 30 years of my father’s 
exertions on the career ladder at GE aerospace. The rewards of my dad’s job were great 
but the price was high — especially for my mother. She was faced with raising six 
children 500 miles away from her closest relatives while my dad put in the long hours 
necessary to make it in corporate America. 
The author’s parents, Margaret and David Keller, 1967.
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While I have vivid and warm memories of our lives as a Vatican II Catholic family 
— priests with guitars and love beads, church services with children sitting cross-legged 
around the altar, “Happenings” (huge parties of Catholic families, priests, and nuns 
singing and playing music) — my family broke from the Catholic Church shortly 
after my own confirmation. My mother, who had participated in the political events of 
the era to the extent possible as a mother of six — protesting the Vietnam War, posing 
as a straw buyer in the fair housing movement, offering our house as a safe house for 
battered women — had grown increasingly alienated from a newly conservative, post-
Vatican II Catholic church, largely due to its views on women and reproductive rights. 
The loss to my parents and our family was, I think, enormous; we never regained the 
extended community I recall us as having in my early childhood. 
The author’s parents raised their daughters to be feminists. Jean, Eileen (front), 
Patricia, and Kris (back) are pictured here in 1968.
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My family was, in the words of one of my cousins, full of “women’s libbers.” The 
boys did housework (but somehow, the girls never cut the grass) and dinner conversa-
tions included such timely topics as women’s rights, abortion, and teenage pregnancy. 
In my family we assumed that the girls’ education was just as important as the boys’ 
and of course the girls would work outside the home. Despite my parents’ progressive 
thinking, I experienced my early commitment to feminism less as a position arrived at 
through intellectual argument than as a matter of survival. As a teen I wanted, above 
all else, to escape my mother’s fate. Despite being proud I had a stay-at-home mom, 
and despite pitying children who had working mothers, I associated being a housewife 
with depression, anger, and resentment. I longed to be free, and freedom to me meant 
following my father’s example — pursuing a career outside the home and cultivating 
a sense of identity based on my own, individual accomplishments. 
As I look back now, I realize I had internalized and was guided by a white, middle 
class, 14-year-old’s vision of liberal feminism. I firmly believed in the equality of men 
and women. Equality for me meant men and women possessing the same skills, pursu-
ing the same jobs, and receiving equal pay for equal work. I envisioned the world, or 
The author’s home temporarily served 
as a safe house for battered women and 
their children. In this 1968 photo, Jean is 
pictured with her “sister” Dalette. 
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at least the U.S., as inhabited by rational adults each pursuing and developing their 
individual talents and receiving recognition for their efforts in the form of generous 
compensation for successful, satisfying, and status-conferring careers (doing what was 
never quite clear). In my youthful naiveté, I believed the obstacles to gender equality 
must already be well on their way to being removed, as the feminist cause was clearly 
so rational and so just.
This conception of liberal feminism carried me through college. I encouraged my 
friends to take Introduction to Women’s Studies and courses taught by radical feminist 
theologian Mary Daly; I was amazed at how they were transformed as a result. (In the 
course of a year one friend turned from a conservative, reserved, lime-green-chinos–
and-dockers-wearing preppy to an outspoken, argumentative, self-declared radical 
feminist-Marxist-Taoist intent on creating social change from the top down.) Yet it 
never occurred to me that I needed to study feminism. After all, I already knew all I 
thought there was to know about feminism — women are just as capable and just as 
valuable as men — and they deserve equal pay for equal work. 
Phase II: 1984–1993 — First Encounters with  
Care Ethics: Resistance to the Theory
Boston College: 1984
Cut to senior year in college; my first encounter with Carol Gilligan, at the hands of 
Kevin, a philosophy graduate student I’d gotten to know from a course on Nietzsche. 
He excitedly tells me about this new book, In a Different Voice, which argues that 
men and women use different models of moral reasoning, with men using justice and 
women care. He then presents me with the Heinz dilemma, in which a man is faced 
with a choice: allowing his wife to die from a rare kind of cancer or breaking into the 
druggist’s laboratory, in order steal the cure for his wife. Kevin asks: what would you 
do if you were in this situation? I smell a trap. I see Gilligan’s gender difference claim 
as implying that women are better suited to being caregivers than men are, and I worry 
that giving her any ground will potentially trap me in a variation on my mother’s life. 
I quickly think back to my recent philosophy classes, in the hope of beating the rap. I 
land on the story of Socrates in Plato’s Crito. Even though Socrates has been unjustly 
condemned to death, he refuses to break the law and escape with his friends’ help. 
Got it! The right answer must be — uphold the law at all costs! After all, my feminist 
philosophical mind reasons, men made the laws, so didn’t it make sense they would 
hold them in high regard? 
With no less than the father of Western philosophy on my side, I slyly inquire: isn’t 
there an alternative to stealing the drug? Aren’t there friends who can help out Heinz 
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and his wife? Perhaps a payment plan could be negotiated? Surely, there must be more 
to this story that can let us resolve this situation! 
As it turns out, I responded in exactly the way Gilligan would have predicted. Rather 
than accept the terms of the story as given, I looked for more narrative detail, espe-
cially with regard to the relationships of the protagonists, in the hope of finding an 
inclusive solution that would save the wife while upholding the law. My answer sounds 
nearly identical to that of Amy, the 11-year-old girl from In a Different Voice, who 
Gilligan thinks models the care approach to moral thinking. By contrast, the justice 
approach is embodied by Jake, a boy who conceives the right to life and the right to 
property hierarchically, with the right to life clearly more important. Such hierarchical 
ranking leads him to the conclusion that of course Heinz should steal the drug to save 
his wife’s life (Gilligan 1982, chapter 2).
A smug and self-satisfied Kevin gloats: “Gilligan’s right! Men and women do think 
differently!” 
I feel angry and betrayed, uncomprehending of how an answer based on Plato could 
possibly be construed as feminine and hence, to my liberal feminist mind — which so 
wants to prove that men and women think alike — wrong. 
Graduate School: 1990–1998
Dissertation. My theme? Models of intersubjective ethics. This topic emerged out of 
my frustration with Kant’s individualism, while taking a graduate seminar on his eth-
ics and epistemology. The two philosophies I’m comparing, because they provide alter-
natives to the Kantian model? Habermas’s discourse ethics and feminist care ethics. 
One key problem I have to address: but what is care ethics? As a philosophical the-
ory, it is still very much under construction in the early 1990s. Which model should 
I use? Or do I create my own model of care ethics? I’m reluctant to do so. Despite 
endorsing care ethics’ conception of the moral agent as necessarily in relation with oth-
ers, I’m still deeply suspicious of the ethic. I am skeptical of the gender difference claim 
and empirical research seems to support such skepticism (see, for example, Greeno and 
Macoby 1993; Luria 1993; Nunner-Winkler 1993; Walker 1993; for defenses of the 
gender difference claim against these critiques, see Baumrind 1993; Gilligan 1987; 
Gilligan 1993). 
Moreover, radical feminist critiques of care ethics for reinforcing women’s tradi-
tional roles and undermining women’s hard fought autonomy resonate deeply with 
me (see, for example, Card 1985, 14–17; Code 1991, 106ff; Hoagland 1992, 85ff; 
Scaltsas 1992, 19ff; Sherwin 1992, 50ff.) Thus, when I read critiques of Nel Noddings 
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for claiming that the severing of relationships inevitably diminishes one’s ethical ideal, 
even in such extreme cases as ending a marriage with an abusive husband, I am right on 
board 1 (Card 1990; Hoagland 1990; Houston 1990; Noddings 1986, 114–115). 
Immersing myself in criticisms of care ethics, it turns out, isn’t an especially produc-
tive approach to writing my dissertation, as my goal isn’t supposed to be to criticize 
care ethics but to show how care ethics provides a viable alternative to the Kantian 
tradition. 
One committee member insists I use the principle of charity when describing care 
ethics. He has me repeatedly revise my care ethics chapter. It takes me a year and a 
half to write this first chapter of my dissertation, because it’s so hard for me to piece 
together a sympathetic account of the ethic. 
Phase III: 2000–2008 — My Gradual  
Conversion to Care Ethics
Okay, I fess up. I’m not globally maternal. I don’t go gaga over random infants and 
toddlers, and I really don’t know how to talk to children who aren’t mine. For much 
of my life, I didn’t even think about children very much — a perspective that was 
reinforced, no doubt, by decades of studying philosophy and living and working in 
college settings. Childhood became for me part of the dues you pay on your way to be-
coming an adult, as opposed to being interesting and important in itself. During this 
period of my life, feminist work on maternal thinking and maternal practice did not 
speak to me, and the aspects of care ethics I found important were those that provided 
alternatives to the Kantian inspired individualistic and universalistic tradition in moral 
theory, namely, care ethics’ relational view of the moral agent and its emphasis on con-
text, particularity, and narrative in moral deliberation. In my teaching and thinking, 
I conceived care ethics mostly as a new addition to the standard list of moral theories, 
as its feminist credentials seemed uncertain. After all, the empirical evidence on the 
much ballyhooed gender difference claim was hotly contested — Gilligan herself was 
eventually forced to clarify her initial gender claim (Gilligan 1987 25–27). This fact, 
coupled with the radical feminist critiques of care ethics, strengthened my perception 
that care ethics, rather than advancing the cause of gender equality, reinforced gender 
stereotypes. 
Three factors, partly personal and partly in the development of the theory itself, 
significantly reshaped my understanding of care ethics and brought me to my current 
view — that care ethics marks a significant development in feminist theorizing that 
has important implications for feminist politics and activism. These three factors 
are team-teaching a class on Feminism and Families in which Joan Tronto’s Moral 
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Boundaries is a central text; becoming a mother myself; and reading Eva Kittay’s book, 
Love’s Labor. 
“Feminism and Families”: The Theory of Having a Family
Spring 2000. In good philosophical style, my husband and I think through the 
implications of becoming parents for seven years before deciding to have children our-
selves. In the midst of our deliberations, I team-teach a senior seminar on Feminism 
and Families with Dr. Sheila Nelson (Sociology), which examines feminist critiques 
of the family and how social structures and social policies impact the family, with 
particular attention to how they contribute to or minimize incidences of poverty.2 We 
read a wide range of sociological and economic literature and use Joan Tronto’s Moral 
Boundaries: Toward a Political Theory of Care for our ethical analysis. Although I have 
taught care ethics in various guises for years now, teaching this course finally helps 
me see the promise of care ethics for developing a trenchant, feminist analysis of our 
society. What’s different here? 
Joan Tronto provides an entirely new way to conceive of care. In the powerful cen-
tral chapters of her book, she breaks acts of caring into four distinct phases: caring 
about, taking care of, caregiving, and care receiving, and then examines how each 
of these components is gendered, raced, and classed. For example, Tronto conceives 
taking care of primarily as administrative work and argues it is typically done by more 
powerful social groups, such as men, whites, and the economically advantaged, where-
as caregiving entails the hands-on provision of care, and is typically done by the least 
powerful social groups — women, people of color, and those who are economically 
disadvantaged. With this analysis, Tronto takes care ethics in a new and promising 
direction — not only are different dimensions of care named, for the first time the 
theory is developed such that it can identify and critique existing social inequalities. 
This shift is made possible by the fact that Tronto’s analysis focuses on care as work, as 
opposed to care as a distinctive (gendered?) form of moral thinking. 
Within the context of Feminism and Families, Tronto’s analysis proves useful for 
students analyzing their service learning placements. Her terminology helps them ana-
lyze where care breaks down with regard to a whole series of family related placements. 
For example, Rachel Wick, a senior philosophy major and Gender and Women’s Stud-
ies minor, initially finds herself frustrated with “Bobbie,” the mother of “Camille,” for 
perpetuating her family’s poverty through her own indolence. Yet when asked to use 
Tronto’s framework to reflect upon her placement, Rachel realizes that Bobbie cared 
about her daughter enough to bring her to the attention of the Children’s Mental 
Health Mentoring Program, which had taken care of Camille by assigning her a men-
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tor, Rachel, who would then give care to Camille. By contrast, no one was demonstrat-
ing such care regarding Bobbie, a poor single mother on worker’s compensation. As 
Rachel says, 
As an adult, Bobbie is assumed to be an autonomous and competent individu-
al, capable of determining her own need for care. Because of this respect for au-
tonomy, Bobbie’s vulnerability and dependence are labeled character flaws. She 
is responsible for the problems in her life, because they are a result of individual 
deficiencies, and this makes it justifiable for me to judge her character and 
maintain distance from her problems.” (Keller, Nelson, and Wick 2003, 47) 
By adopting the care perspective, which emphasizes that periods of dependency in-
evitably recur throughout our lives, Rachel shifts from an attitude of detachment and 
judgment to one of engagement and compassion; she asks the critical question: why 
weren’t social service agencies acknowledging and addressing Bobbie’s need for care? 
In the introduction to her book, Tronto declares her goal of liberating care from 
three moral boundaries that have constrained it — the boundary between morality 
and politics, which grants moral arguments little purchase within politics; the moral 
point of view boundary, which conceives morality proper as impartial and universal; 
and the boundary between the public and the private, which views care ethics as an 
ethic of the private sphere, detached from public life (Tronto 1993, 6–11). My experi-
ence using Moral Boundaries in Feminism and Families suggests Tronto succeeds in her 
goal, shifting our understanding of care from an ethic of interpersonal relationships 
to a useful tool for analyzing public policies and social practices, from the question of 
“is care a feminine way of thinking” to “what would it mean to take care seriously as a 
political value?” Tronto’s version of care ethics finally allows me to see the transforma-
tional possibilities of adopting a care ethic. 
“Famous last words: ‘I am not going to get 
married and I am not going to have children’.” 
The author with daughter Jeong Lan, spouse 
Chuck, and son Sang.
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The Practice of Having a Family
As has doubtless been the case for many women before me, I soon found parent-
ing to be the single most demanding project I have ever undertaken. Among other 
parenting challenges, I find that parenting requires a consistent taming of the ego in a 
society which places repeated emphasis on its cultivation and indulgence. Surrounded 
by parenting books, attending various adoption and parenting workshops, engaging 
in many late night parenting strategy sessions with my spouse, and making daily reso-
lutions to take parenting — you guessed it — one day at a time, I am consistently 
aware of the enduring gap between my parenting ideals and my parenting practice. I 
am stunned that anyone would ever think mothering somehow comes “naturally” to 
women or that reproduction of the species is primarily a biological function we share 
in common with other animals. Suddenly I understand on a visceral level why Sara 
Ruddick’s book, Maternal Thinking, became a feminist classic and why In a Different 
Voice became a national bestseller that instigated such a storm of thinking and writing 
by women philosophers and psychologists. 
Given the centrality of care for the survival of our species, and given how much 
thought and discipline must go into responding to demands for care in a calm, con-
sistent, compassionate, and productive manner, under some of the most challenging 
of circumstances, the failure of philosophy to take seriously this dimension of human 
experience is, I now understand intellectually, emotionally, and physically — shock-
ing. Finally philosophy is taking seriously a set of values, issues, and concerns that have 
been central to women’s lives — and to the survival of the species — forever. For in 
order for children to grow up and become the highly functional selves that populate 
philosophical narratives, from the ancients to social contract theory, from Sartre to 
Rawls — one or more people need to devote a lot of time and energy to their develop-
ment. 
With these realizations, the trajectory of my conversations with my mother change 
dramatically. Throughout my 20s, my siblings and I regularly confronted my parents 
for perceived inadequacies in their raising of us. Now I call my mother with genuine 
amazement in my voice: Mom, how did you ever manage to raise six children and find 
the time, energy, and initiative to make homemade spaghetti sauce with meatballs? 
How did you manage to sort through eight people’s clothes and keep them clean, well 
ordered, and in season? Forget that, how did you find the time to get us all bathed, 
with everything else you were doing? How did you do all of that with a husband who 
was often on the road and with no extended network of support? I now find myself 
astonished by these organizational miracles. 
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Love’s Labor: Public Policy and the Family
In the single worst piece of professional advice I was ever given, a fellow graduate 
student tells me in my first weeks of graduate school that I won’t really want to work 
closely with Eva Kittay. As that student explained, “she doesn’t really do feminism, she 
does that care stuff.” Years later, when I eventually get around to reading Eva Kittay’s 
tour de force, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, I am stunned 
by its beauty, insight, and rhetorical force. Eva is instantly inducted into my personal 
pantheon of feminist philosophical goddesses. 
Rather than emphasizing the particularism, narrative, and attention to context of 
care thinking, as did Gilligan and early care ethicists, Kittay’s analysis is similar to 
Tronto’s in that it focuses on the political, philosophical, and public policy implica-
tions of taking seriously care work (which Kittay calls “dependency work” ). With arti-
cles that range from the deeply personal and moving story of caring for her profoundly 
mentally retarded daughter, Sesha, to critically engaging the notions of equality and 
reciprocity embedded in John Rawls’ towering works, A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism, to challenging the time limits and work requirements entailed by the 1996 
welfare reform law, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Kittay envisions 
and urges us to create a world that is organized around supporting dependents and the 
dependency workers who care for them. Given that women still do a disproportionate 
amount of the dependency work in our society, Kittay argues that it is only in such a 
world that women will be able to achieve social and political equality. As Kittay suc-
cinctly puts it: 
Looking at the economy of social cooperation in terms of burdens and re-
sponsibilities, we see that the independent fully functioning citizen assumes 
the burdens and responsibilities of one, while the dependency worker assumes 
those of more than one, and the dependent those of less than one. If we look 
at that same economy in terms of benefits, we see the dependent still counting 
as one, as does the fully functioning citizen. In contrast, however, if the depen-
dency worker must also secure rights and benefits for her charge, even at the 
expense of her own rights and benefits, her own welfare comes to count for less 
than one. (Kittay 1999, 91)
Economists have argued that women, in deciding to have children, make a free 
choice that ends up compromising their economic and, Kittay would add, social and 
political status (see Fuchs 1989, for example). They argue that if women don’t like 
these negative effects of their life choices, they alone bear responsibility, as they could 
have chosen differently. Kittay contends it is wrongheaded to view mothering and oth-
er forms of dependency work in this way. As she argues, “If none made such a choice, 
society could not continue beyond a single generation. Therefore this is a conception 
H e a d w a t e r s      A  CSB/SJU Facu l ty  Journa l  73
of the good which occupies a special place with respect to the welfare of society” (Kit-
tay 1999, 92).3 Thus, for Kittay, dependency work is not one life choice among many 
about which the state should remain neutral. Rather, in a just society the state should 
ensure that social policies are in place to ensure the well-being of dependency workers 
who, by attending to the needs of their charges, work for the well-being of all of us. 
________________________
Kittay’s account of care ethics helps me better understand my dilemma at age 14. I 
knew I wanted equality and respect and to be able to make my own choices regarding 
how to live my life. I had intuitively absorbed the liberal conception of equality, which 
only granted equality to persons unencumbered by obligations to dependent others. 
Thus, faced with the choice of career and equality or family and inequality, the answer 
to me was clear — equality. 
In 1977, neither my parents nor the feminism I had embraced had developed the 
conceptual framework that would have helped me understand why I was being faced 
with this set of options. The answer to gender inequality at that time seemed to be that 
women should act as ideal workers and be wholly committed to their careers. There 
seemed to be no cost, only benefit, associated with abandoning traditional feminine 
roles. The development of care ethics, with its emphasis on the centrality of the work 
of care to a well-functioning society, helped make it clear that the answer to patriarchy 
couldn’t simply be a wholesale abandonment of care. Rather, as Kittay demonstrates, 
achieving gender equality requires acknowledging the widespread need for care, shar-
ing more equitably the burdens and joys of caregiving, and restructuring public policy 
and social institutions to ensure that caregivers are also cared for and can participate as 
equals in political, social, and economic life. Far from reinforcing gender stereotypes, 
this version of care is a radical and life affirming feminist philosophy that promises a 
better world for all. 
Jean Keller is an Associate Professor of Philosophy. 
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Notes
1.  See also Victoria Davison’s concern that Noddings’ “engrossment” in the other can undermine indi-
vidual autonomy and integrity by leading one to place the relationship above one’s own deeply held 
principles (Davion 1993, 168–73). 
2.  For more information on this course, read the jointly authored article, “Care Ethics, Service-Learning, 
and Social Change” (Keller, Nelson, and Wick 2003, 39–50). 
3.  This general theme, that dependency workers are penalized in a multitude of ways for providing care-
giving work necessary for the survival of the species, is taken up by a series of recent authors who, like 
Kittay, suggest how we can begin to change public policies to rectify this situation. See, for example, 
Crittenden 2001, Folbre 2002, and Williams 2000.
